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2Across rural Bangladesh, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are offering poor
women economic opportunities.  Among these NGOs, the Grameen Bank (GB) has successfully
implemented group lending to provide poor rural women access to collateral-free loans.  The
institution’s economic effectiveness, management practices, and long-term sustainability have
been widely researched (Holcombe, 1995; Jain, 1996; Yaron, 1994).  Social scientists have also
considered whether borrowers actually control investment of the microcredit loans (Goetz and
Sen Gupta, 1996).  Still others have investigated whether GB loans and membership empower
borrowers (Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996).  This paper is a departure from previous work as
it focuses on whether GB members’ regular interaction at the village-level loan repayment
building, the “center,” facilitates the members’ ability to establish and strengthen networks
outside their living quarters and kinship groups.  I refer to these networks, their attributes, and
their impact on the community as “social capital.”  I find that, by attending weekly center
meetings, GB members have the opportunity to build a kind of social wealth not measurable in
simple financial terms.
BACKGROUND
Grameen Bank
The GB provides the poor of Bangladesh with an alternative to formal banking
institutions by offering landless villagers small loans collateralized by group accountability rather
than tangible assets.  To qualify for membership, individuals must own less than half an acre of
cultivable land and/or own assets with a total value less than the value of one acre of medium-
quality land.  In addition, the GB has primarily sought to lend to women because they are the
least empowered among Bangladesh’s rural poor (Khandker, Khalily, and Khan, 1996).  As of
November 1997, women comprised 98 percent of GB borrowers, and the average loan size was
3US$100, payable over 52 consecutive weeks (Grameen Dialogue, January 1998).1
Candidates for GB membership must form or join a five-member group,2 learn to write
their signatures, and memorize a sixteen-point social development constitution.  The groups are
formed by members themselves, with the restriction that women from the same household cannot
belong to the same group.3  The social development constitution, the “Sixteen Decisions,”
includes pledges for members to develop their families through education, vegetable planting,
installation of sanitary latrines, and avoidance of giving or receiving dowries (see Hossain,
1993).
In general, eight five-member groups comprise the GB center.  Each week, the forty
center members traverse the village to meet collectively at the center building.  Once assembled,
the meeting begins with salutes and a short exercise routine.  Members then sign an attendance
book while each group’s elected chairperson pays loan installments to the GB worker on behalf
of her group.  The meetings provide members opportunities they did not have before GB
membership that include: walking across the village to attend GB meetings; sitting with women
from different kinship, religious, and social status groups; handling money; and receiving
personal address from the GB employee.  These opportunities flow from the obligations of GB
membership.
The routines and rituals that members follow each week are the institutional norms of GB
membership.  These institutional norms have also been referred to as the “rules of the game”
(North, 1990), and are believed to shape human experience and personal identity (Connell, 1987;
Giddens, 1986).  Schuler and Hashemi (1994) write:  “In performing the rituals of membership, a
woman develops a strong identification with Grameen Bank.  This bond makes it easier for her to
resist the tight strictures of the traditional family and to adhere to the regulations of the program”
4(p. 73).  Knight (1992) has observed that institutions allow people to “produce, by acting with
others, benefits that they would fail to achieve by acting alone” (p. 25).  The norms of GB
membership seem to provide members with a structure to their lives that enables this type of
cooperation.  GB’s village-level institutional structure seems to enable rural women to creatively
combine social and economic development.
Group Lending
The term “group lending,” generally refers to a process whereby individual loans are
disbursed to a small group of borrowers (three to ten) who are then collectively responsible for
loan repayment, effectively substituting joint liability for conventional loan requirements.
Ideally, the group’s joint liability produces both peer pressure and peer support which encourages
prompt payment of loan installments.  From an institutional perspective, group lending presents
possible advantages4 because it largely shifts the burden of establishing membership eligibility
and timely loan repayment from the organization to the borrowers (Berger, 1989; Montgomery,
1996).
Some social scientists assert that the social benefits borrowers gain in group lending
programs flow from nurturing relationships among group members.  Berenbach and Guzman
(1992) reviewed group lending in Africa, Asia, and the Americas and concluded that group
lending is generally successful because of the positive preexisting relationships among
borrowers.  According to the authors, “the group’s own dynamic, beginning with self-selection,
is the impetus for successful group lending” (Berenbach and Guzman, 1992, p. 6).  These
researchers assert that mutual support is inherent in lending group self-selection and claim that
social development is rooted in the small group.  “The solidarity group, because of its basis in
mutual support,” the authors conclude, “frees borrowers from historically dependent
5relationships…the peer group itself becomes the building block to a broader social network”
(Berenbach and Guzman, 1992, p. 4).  Fuglesang and Chandler (1993) similarly concluded that
an attitude prevails among GB members “that the group must proceed as a whole” (p. 100).
Others who have studied microcredit programs reject the notion that mutual support and
solidarity inhere in group lending.  The mutual support ideology often promoted among
practitioners seems unlikely, according to Kabeer (1998), because “there is no reason why
women who are in entrepreneurial competition with each other are going to have a natural
affinity to form into groups together” (p. 10).  Montgomery (1996) and Todd (1996) also warn
group lending advocates that relationships implied in group lending terminology — “mutual
support” or “solidarity group” — do not necessarily exist among borrowers.  Instead, borrowers
may or may not develop feelings of reciprocity, and, if they do, the feelings often vary drastically
among group members.  Todd (1996) points out that, because credit is the only resource women
in Bangladesh have to improve their economic status, credit is viewed as a privilege that each
member fiercely protects as an “individual right.”
Women’s Networks in Bangladesh
Women in rural Bangladesh are largely governed by Islamic law and patriarchal customs.
Patrilocal residence, the residence established when a bride moves from her father’s village to
her husband’s village after marriage, dislocates a woman from established networks in her natal
village.  Rural customs especially limit a boji’s (village wife’s) opportunities to establish and
strengthen networks beyond her familial associations.  In her bari (homestead),5 a boji’s
movement and demeanor are monitored by her husband, relatives, and neighbors.  As a new wife
in an unfamiliar village, a boji does not have the opportunity to orient herself to the village’s
geography, a geography that is well known to the gramer meye (daughter of the village).  She is
6constrained from doing so by the social pressure which demands conformance with purdah
norms.6  These norms encourage boji and gramer meye to remain secluded within their paras
(neighborhoods),7 if not within their baris.
However, women’s absence from public spaces does not mean they have no connection to
the other members of the community (Kabeer, 1994; Todd, 1996; White, 1992).  Women have
their own “informal associations” (March & Taqqu, 1986) formed and convened in and around
their baris when washing clothes, processing rice, or caring for children.  Because women have
traditionally been excluded from formal institutions, informal associations have expanded
women’s social and economic lives and have served as important information channels and
support systems (March & Taqqu, 1986).  However, the relationships cultivated through these
associations exist primarily among close neighbors and those who share bongsho ties.8  Unlike
men, rural women rarely have the socially sanctioned opportunity to convene in common spaces
beyond the confines of their para.  This confinement limits their extra-familial social ties and
opportunities for exposure beyond the boundaries of their homestead.
Social Capital
Social capital is comprised of a complex of obligations, expectations, norms, and trust
embedded in the relations between members of a community (Coleman, 1990). Whereas physical
capital can be thought of as the tools and training that enhance individual productivity, social
capital refers to the “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67).  Methods for
developing social capital may vary according to culture.  But once formed, the central
components of social capital — norms, networks, and trust — are transferable from one setting
in a community to another setting in the same community (Putnam, 1993).  A community
7endowed with social capital may be free from crime or evidence the kind of trust that enables
individuals to “go to the market with only their faces, their name, and their honour for money”
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 185).  Social capital is an especially powerful asset because it is a public
good which benefits all members of a community — those who contribute to it, and those who
do not (Coleman, 1990).
Regular, public association of members of a community has been credited with
mobilizing a community’s social capital (Hirschmann, 1984; Putnam, 1993).  Repeated
interaction enables personal trust to transition into social trust and allows individual norms to
transition into shared norms.  According to Putnam (1993), social ties formed through regular
gatherings mobilize social capital because they “facilitate gossip and other valuable ways of
cultivating reputation — an essential foundation for trust within a complex society” (p. 37).
Such community interaction encourages participants’ transition from the “‘I’ to the ‘we,’” while
enhancing “participants’ ‘taste’ for collective benefits” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67).  Networks formed
through regular interaction give each participant a vision of herself as a member of a larger
community.
In a culture where a woman’s identity is primarily established and traced through male
family members, a sense of individual identity can be crucial to establishing extra-familial group
identity.  Given the broad definitions of social capital, and the possible benefits to those who
produce it and to their community, I chose to investigate whether GB membership at the GB
center facilitated social capital formation among the forty assembled members.
8THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Theoretical Constructs
Key concepts for this study are operationalized as follows:
Social capital is broadly defined as the attributes of community life and social
organization — such as norms, networks, and social trust — that facilitate coordination and
cooperation to the benefit of both GB members and villagers not affiliated with GB (Coleman,
1988; Putnam, 1995).
GB center meeting norms include the following: walking across the village to attend the
center meeting; sitting with a group of women from different bongsho, religions, and social
status at the center meeting; handling money; and first name address from the GB employee
during the center meeting.
Individual identity is defined as a member’s awareness that she has a significance in the
community independent of her familial relationships.
Collective identity is defined as the feelings of allegiance or alliance that develop over
time among those who regularly participated in a similar activity.
Building networks is defined as a process whereby relationships are established between
two or more members who did not know each other before membership.
Strengthening networks is defined as a process whereby relationships between two or
more people, who knew each other before membership, become closer because of membership.
Research Questions
Research questions included the following:
1. Are lending groups formed by women who knew each other before GB?
2. Do center meeting norms enable women to establish individual identities?
93. Does group interaction at regular center meetings facilitate collective identity?
4. What factors do GB members identify as comprising their social capital?
5. Has participation in regular center meetings reduced members’ practice of purdah or
increased their participation in democracy?
6. Has the social capital formed among center members been witnessed by or affected the daily
lives of other villagers?
STUDY SITE, FIELD METHODS, AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Study Site
My research on social capital formation primarily focused on one GB center (Center A)
located in a village sixty miles southwest of Dhaka in the Faridpur District (see diagram,
Appendix 1).  Center A was established in 1990.  Center A’s village contained 132 households
comprising forty-eight baris clustered along a river.  A road connecting the towns of Faridpur
and Madaripur intersected the village.  The village was approximately one mile long oriented on
a general north-south axis.  Twenty-one percent of the villagers were Hindu; the remaining 79
percent were Muslim.  The Hindu para was divided among the Pal (sculptors and potters),
Karmokar (blacksmiths), and Brahmin (religious leaders, astrologers) castes.  The Muslim para
was primarily populated by three bongsho:  Mattabar, Khan, and Sheik.  The village
infrastructure included two saw-mills, two mosques, two mots (Hindu religious monuments
erected to commemorate the deceased), one Proshika9 school, and an independent middle school.
Primary health care needs were served by a village doctor, a government family planning worker,
an NGO health worker, and a dai (midwife).
Field Methods
Field work took place over nine months.  During that time, my assistant and I spent an
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average of 10 hours a day in the village.  We traveled using only local transportation, shared
meals with villagers, attended Muslim and Hindu celebrations, and participated in activities that
enabled us to become a part of the villagers’ daily lives.  Research methods included participant
observation, structured survey questionnaires, network analysis, and in-depth interviews.  My
assistant, a Bangladeshi researcher who had previously worked in the area under study,
introduced us to villagers and assisted with translation.
The research assistant and I began data collection by traveling from bari to bari gathering
information from individual GB members.  Information included:  (1) first name; (2) husband’s
name; (3) bongsho/caste; (4) natal village; (5) distance from Center A’s village to natal village;
(6) year GB membership began; and (7) GB membership status (active/inactive).  Next, I
collected data for the network analysis, which was designed to identify the effect of GB
membership on members’ networks.10  Thirty-eight Center A members participated in the
network analysis.11  I asked each member if she knew the other thirty-eight members’ first names
before she joined GB and if she knew their names after membership.
Informal discussions with the respondents during this phase of data collection
familiarized me with the villagers and the social issues in their community.  These discussions
enabled me to create a community- and culturally-specific survey questionnaire designed to
measure social capital.12  Thirty-nine Center A members completed the survey, which included
both open-ended and close-ended questions.13  In order to access a larger respondent pool,
surveys were also disseminated in an additional GB center.  “Center B” is located within the
same GB branch14 as Center A and was also established in 1990.  Thirty-three Center B members
responded to the survey.15 Finally, in-depth interviews were conducted with Center A members,
their husbands, village leaders, land-owners, a family planning worker, and a health educator.
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Sample Description
Eight of the forty Center A members were gramer meye , women who were raised in the
village and remained there after marrying men from the village.  The other thirty-two Center A
members were boji who moved an average of five miles from their fathers’ homes to live in their
husbands’ villages after marriage.  Seven Center A members were Hindu, and thirty-three were
Muslim.  Thirty-three Center A members were married and lived with their husbands.  Seven
Center A  members were widows.16  All of the GB members in Center B were married and
Muslim.  A majority (54 percent) of respondents from Centers A and B were between 25 and 40
years of age.  Seventy-four percent of the respondents in Center A and 73 percent of those in
Center B reported receiving no formal education.  Eighteen percent of all the respondents
reported completing some primary education.  Membership in the GB represented the first formal
institutional affiliation for all of the respondents.
During my nine month investigation, Center A members had a 100 percent loan
repayment rate, a 95 percent meeting attendance rate, and an average membership tenure of seven
years.  Center B members had a 95 percent loan repayment rate, an 80 percent weekly attendance
rate, and an average membership tenure of five years.17
FINDINGS
Are Lending Groups Formed By Women Who Knew Each Other Before Membership?
In March 1990, Center A was established by a GB employee who went to the village and
spoke with male villagers.  The GB employee informed the men that landless women in their
village would have an opportunity to receive collateral-free loans and asked the men to pass this
information to women they believed would qualify for membership.  The men then contacted two
women.  One of these women, Rokeya Begum, 18 contacted her friends who lived in the baris
12
adjacent to hers and encouraged them to form a lending group with her.
Rokeya and her friends formed Center A’s first group.  Over the next year Rokeya
promoted the formation of additional groups by traveling throughout the village to inform other
women of borrowing opportunities.  This travel in and about the village was unusual because it
represented a significant departure from social custom and purdah norms.  Although Rokeya had
grown up and married in the village, she did not know other village women apart from those who
lived in adjacent baris.  Rokeya explained that her initial efforts to form GB groups were inspired
by her feeling of responsibility to the other women.  Although Rokeya’s family was well-known,
she was not recognized when traveling through the village, and her family name did not protect
her from threats and criticism.
When respondents were asked how their five-member group was formed, 28 percent
reported that the center chief19 asked them to join, 25 percent reported they joined a “broken”
group (a group with a vacant position) with the center chief’s assistance, and 25 percent reported
another member to whom they were not related asked them to join.  Twenty-two percent of the
respondents sought membership on their own initiative by talking to the center chief or another
member (Table 1).  In order to investigate whether “mutual support” or “solidarity” played a part
in group member selection, I asked respondents what criteria would make a group candidate
more eligible if multiple candidates vied for a single group position.  Eighty-five percent of the
respondents reported that the candidate who had the greatest ability to repay loans would be
selected.  The remaining 15 percent reported that the candidate whose husband had regular
earnings would be the most desirable.
Respondents were also asked if they had helped other women become members.  Sixty
percent reported that they had offered no assistance.  Of the 40 percent who believed they had
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helped someone to become a member, 34 (80 percent) reported that they assisted a candidate by
recommending her name to the center chief.
Do Center Meeting Norms Enable Women to Establish Individual Identities?
 In rural Bangladesh women customarily have no opportunity to gather publicly and are
identified using only possessive terms denoting their relationship to the family’s male members
(e.g., Hafez’s daughter, Bablu’s wife,20 or Firoz’s mother).  By contrast, Center A members
weekly convene at the center, located at the intersection of the Muslim and Hindu paras.  At the
center, a GB employee refers to each woman by her first name when calling attendance or
collecting loan installments.
The survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews were used to evaluate whether the
center meeting norm of personal address prompted positive or negative feelings among members.
All respondents reported they liked being called by their first name at the center meetings.  When
asked why they liked hearing their first names, 33 percent responded that hearing their names
spoken was beautiful.  This sentiment was echoed by Nurjahan, who explained, “GB people were
the first to call me by name since I left my father’s bari 40 years ago.”  Twenty-six percent of the
respondents reported that hearing their first name spoken was important to them because it
indicated an educated person, the male GB worker, was showing them respect.  Sixteen percent
reported they liked the individual recognition because they considered their first names evidence
of an identity apart from their traditional familial identity.  Respondents reported that they
preferred being addressed by their first names rather than traditional kinship terms.  Paru reported
she enjoyed hearing her first name and explained, “especially because it is spoken in a crowd; it
is good to have lots of people know my own name.”  Fuljhan reported that, before GB came to
her village, “no one knew the names of poor women.  Now they do.”
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The network analysis revealed that, before membership, Center A members knew an
average of 11 of the other 38 members’ first names.  After membership, the women knew an
average of 32 of the other 38 members’ names.  Figure 1 plots the change in knowledge of other
members’ names for each Center A member.  For example, Paru (#7 on the x-axis) knew only
one other center member’s name (her mother-in-law’s) before membership but knew 38
members’ names after membership.
Eighty-one percent of the members believed they had changed as individuals because of
their interaction with the other members at the weekly center meetings.   Thirty-one percent of
these women recognized that because of their new relationships they could go outside their bari
without an escort, 31 percent reported a new found confidence to talk to others, and 21 percent
believed that meeting at the center had made them “more intelligent.”  Rubina explained that
because of center meetings she no longer needed to “borrow knowledge from others in [her]
bari.”  “I can do things on my own now,” she asserted.
Does Group Interaction at Regular Center Meetings Facilitate Collective Identity?
Network analysis enabled comparison between relationships, direct and indirect, that
existed among the women before and after they became GB members.  Out of 1,482 possible
relationships that could have existed between the 38 women before they joined GB, 531 (35.8
percent) of the relationships were direct relationships; 809 (54.6 percent) of the relationships
were indirectly connected through one other woman; 67 (4.5 percent) of the relationships were
indirectly connected through two other women; and 75 (5.1 percent) of the relationships did not
exist before membership.  In contrast, after the women joined GB, 1,367 (92.2 percent) of the
relationships were direct relationships; 77 (5.2 percent) of the relationships were connected
indirectly through one other woman; none of the women were connected through two women;
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and 38 (2.6 percent) of the possible relationships were not formed (Table 2).
When asked open-ended questions about how they felt when sitting among other
members of different bongsho, castes, and social status, 78 percent of the respondents reported
they felt good because, at the center, everyone is equal and sits with one mind (shobai shoman,
ek mon hoye boshi).  Sixteen percent of the members reported they enjoyed gathering with the
diverse group of women at the center because they felt that they were all human beings (amrah
shobai manush) and understood each other when sitting together (amrah ek shate boshi takhon
eke aporke).  Farida explained she felt good meeting at the center because while there she
“forgets who is higher and who is lower status.”
When members were asked how they felt when they missed a meeting, 59 percent
reported that they felt bad because they missed the opportunity to see or talk to the other
members.  Eighteen percent reported they felt bad because they wondered what the GB employee
and the other members said about their absence.  Conversely, 15 percent did not feel bad about
the missed meeting because they had an emergency at home and simply could not attend.  Of the
women who missed meetings, 56 percent could not attend because they were sick, 39 percent had
work at home, and 17 percent had an emergency at home.  Eighty-nine percent of the women
who missed a meeting reported that they asked other members what took place at the meeting in
their absence.
To further investigate respondents’ thoughts about center meetings, I asked how the
members would feel if a male family member commanded them to terminate their membership.
Thirty-two percent of the respondents said they would feel bad because they enjoy the regular
opportunity to meet with other women at the center.  Kona explained that she would have to
comply with her husband’s demand, but would continue to visit the members who had become
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her friends.  Thirteen percent of the women reported they would not feel good if they did not
attend center meetings because they would not have the opportunity to listen to anyone outside
their bari.  Mala explained she would feel bad if she could not go to the center because she
“would not see ‘ten people,’ would not listen to ‘ten words’ from others, and would not have a
chance to tell my ‘ten words’ to others.”21
Amena admitted that she would not want her daughter to be a GB member because “GB
membership means we are poor.”  However, Amena was proud to note that, because she was a
member, the other women had become her “own people” (apon hoto).22  Similarly, Rinia’s desire
for social interaction at the center did not cease after she left GB due to her economic
advancement.  Instead, after Rinia had formally withdrawn as a member, each week she lingered
at the center building’s doorway to see and talk to her friends.  Like Rinia, 68 percent of
respondents reported they had become close friends with one, and as many as three, other GB
member(s) since becoming members themselves.  Seventeen percent reported making four close
friends at the center, and six percent had made eight close friends at the center.  When asked why
they felt closest to the women they identified as new friends, 35 percent said that their close
friends would come first if the member needed help, and 31 percent felt close because they
confided in each other.  The remaining respondents felt close to their new friends because they
were neighbors (25 percent) or were in the same lending group (22 percent).  All of those who
reported having made friends also reported visiting their friends during the week between center
meetings.
While members did not all welcome the opportunity to interact at the center, regular
group interaction is an obligation of membership.  Well known in Center A’s village is the story
of Bandanna Rani, a low-caste Hindu woman, who scandalously (given that most marriages are
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arranged) married Shanti Lota’s high caste son out of love.  Although both women were GB
members, Shanti Lota refused to speak to or acknowledge Bandanna Rani due to Bandanna’s
perceived breach of religious marriage practice.  Both women, however, sat on adjacent benches
each week at the center.  During the meetings, other members encouraged their interaction by
teasing or including them in conversations.  Without GB membership, the social pressure for
their interaction would be reduced by religious differences throughout the caste-segregated Hindu
neighborhood, rather than intensified at center meetings.  Given this division between the
women, it was interesting to note that the “biggest change” Shanti Lota had seen in herself since
becoming a member was that she had traveled outside the Hindu neighborhood to visit a Muslim
center member.  Shanti Lota did not visit Muslim villagers in her 36 years in the village before
becoming a GB member.  Maya, a GB member from Center A’s beginning, shared this story with
me and also explained that quarrels among the members in her para were less frequent “because
every week we sit together and if there is anything in our minds we settle it.  If we do not speak
to each other [at the center] then it means we have a problem in our mind.  [Not speaking] creates
bad feelings for everyone.  So because of [the center meetings] the quarrels are now less.”
What Factors Do GB Members Identify as Comprising Their Social Capital?
While the GB worker documented each member’s and group’s payments, the women
used this “empty” time during the approximately 90 minute meetings to “share their hearts” in a
space apart from male family members. 23  Eighty-three percent of all respondents said that when
waiting to pay their installment they used the time to talk with other members.  The remaining 17
percent said they used the time to listen to conversations between other members.  Sufie, for
example, explained that center meetings gave her the opportunity to talk to people and that this
talk has shown her “how to maintain relationships with others.”  In Maya’s words, “before the
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center we were not comfortable with the other people [we now know from the center].  Now we
meet once a week where we discuss good and bad things.”  According to Rokeya Begum, the
information contained in the conversations at the center is “anonder bishoy” (the subject of our
joy).
Before membership, the extent of the women’s networks often depended upon whether
they were gramer meye, boji, or widows.  However, after joining GB all of these women believed
their interaction at center meetings enabled them to expand their existing networks.  Rokeya
Begum was a gramer meye and the first Center A lending circle organizer.  She explained that
although her natal family was well known in Center A’s village, she did not interact with most of
the GB members before membership because she did not know them.  “Now,” she explained,
“membership has made me more popular because more people know me.”  In contrast, Paru was
a boji who moved from her father’s village to her husband’s village two years before she joined
GB.  During those two years she did not know anyone in the village outside her husband’s bari.
She emphasized that, because she could regularly meet with women from different areas of the
village at the center, she had had an opportunity to establish her own information networks.
Because of Paru’s new networks, she believed, she learned of and enrolled in the government’s
mass education program.  Through this program Paru learned to read.  Soburon was also a boji.
However, she lived more than 20 years in the village before her husband’s death made her
especially dependent on her new networks.  GB loans allowed her to purchase a cow whose milk
she sold for profit.  At the center meetings, Soburon repaid her loan and secured promises from
members to save their nutrient rich rice water — the water that remains in the pot after rice is
boiled — for her cow to drink.  She explained that her “rice water network” is larger than it
would have been without her GB membership because she has made friends and now goes to see
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the women from outside her kinship network.
Seventy-one percent of the respondents reported that, before membership, they did not
know the village’s geography.  With few exceptions, the women were secluded within their baris
where they interacted almost exclusively with their husband’s kin.  Eighty-two percent of the
respondents acknowledged they did not visit or interact with women from the center before
membership.  Fifty-three percent did not interact with others from the center because they did not
know them.  Rinia remembered that before membership she was afraid to go out of her bari.
“But now,” she explained, “I am not afraid to go out.  The other women are familiar to me.  I am
familiar to them so they will not wonder why I am in their bari.  Before I joined GB I did not
know them so it would not have been natural for me to visit them.”  Twenty-four percent of all
respondents reported they did not visit each other because “boji are not allowed to leave the
bari.”
But for Khaleda, GB membership has eased the mobility restrictions imposed on boji.
“Before GB membership,” she explained, “people in my family would ask where I was going if I
wanted to leave the bari.  Now they don’t ask.  They know I have places to go and are only
curious to know where I have been after I return.”  Eighty-nine percent of the respondents
reported that they now go places, and feel comfortable going places, they did not go before
membership.  Their new mobility included travel to the center building24 (100 percent);
marketplace and village shops (13 percent); and the health and family planning clinic (11
percent).
Before membership, 43 percent of all respondents never went to see other women from
the center — or visited members they knew only once a month.  After becoming members, 75
percent of the respondents reported stopping in at baris across the village to see other members
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from their center weekly or daily.  Rokeya Begum remembered that, before becoming a GB
member, she did not stop in to see many of the other women from Center A because she did not
know them and “no one goes to another person’s bari without a purpose.”  “Now we are
members and that gives us a reason to stop to see other members,” she added.
The women’s interaction apart from center meetings often begins for business purposes
— discussing alternative economic opportunities or helping with loan repayment.  Seventy-four
percent of all respondents reported that they had helped other members to make up shortfalls on
GB loan installments.  These initial economic transactions often developed into personal
relationships.   Hasina explained that since joining Center A, she has gone to many different
areas to collect personal loans she made to other women.  “I never did this or had this exposure
before GB,” she said.  “Now if someone asks me to sit down and talk with them in their bari, I
can and I do.”
According to respondents the newly formed economic ties have also provided an avenue
for exchange of limited resources.  For example, Rashida can now borrow a sari or gold jewelry
from another member to wear to her relatives’ bari.  Maya, on the other hand, confided that she
did not have tangible goods worth lending, but candidly proclaimed that since becoming a
member she frequently lends her knowledge to friends from the center.  Before membership,
such exchanges were not practiced between unrelated women, according to Rokeya Begum,
because “our ties were confined to a small group of peopleÖmy mind resisted asking to borrow,
because if they had refused I would have been ashamed, but now we are friends.  We have more
trust so we can borrow and lend such things [among members].”
The opportunity for exchange between members seems to have especially benefited boji
who, before membership, often had no choice but to rely on ties in their natal village during
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difficult times.  Anjura remembered that “it was not unlikely for our husbands to send us back to
our father’s house for a loan or some help when [our family] had economic or social problems.”
Now, according to Anjura, this practice has largely stopped, because GB members have their
own networks that enable them to borrow or seek assistance from villagers in the community
where they live.  The frequency with which survey respondents visited their natal village
reflected Anjura’s experiences.  Before membership, 15 percent of the responding boji made
weekly visits to their natal village, whereas only 3 percent made weekly visits to their natal
village after membership.  Similarly, 31 percent of the boji visited their natal village once a
month before membership, but after membership 20 percent visited their natal village once a
month.   Twenty-five percent of the boji visited their natal village once every three months before
membership, but after membership 21 percent visited their natal village once every three months
(Figure 2).
Community members’ enhanced ability to participate in somoj raka kora (social
obligations) provides further evidence that center meetings have strengthened members’ resource
networks.  Social obligations in rural Bangladesh include serving unexpected guests muree
(puffed rice) or joining in marriage celebrations.  But before membership, many of the members
said they did not welcome guests into their bari and would not travel to visit other baris.  The
absence of this social exchange often resulted from limited networks and finances — often the
members did not know anyone from the village, were not known by others in the village, and did
not have refreshments to offer a guest.  Ninety-four percent of the respondents reported GB
membership enabled them to meet social obligations in the village.  Eighty-one percent of the
respondents reported that they were better able to fulfill a broad spectrum of social obligations
since their membership in GB.  For 8 percent of the members, this meant that they had received
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invitations to social occasions.  “We are no longer invisible,” was a popular response to my
inquiry regarding social obligations.  Others attributed the change in their social life to
economics.  Forty-five percent of the respondents said they could now serve guests refreshments,
26 percent were able to give a wedding gift, and 19 percent could give a better wedding gift than
they could before membership.  All of the respondents agreed that they had more social
invitations, because of friends made at the center, than they did before membership.  In general,
Center A members identified their social capital as:  their interaction both with women at the
center and outside the center; their newly gained mobility outside of their bari to visit other
members and travel to “public” spaces in the village; the exchange of scarce resources; the
opportunity to rely on networks in a “marital” village rather than a natal village; and, the ability
to participate in social obligations.
Has Participation in Regular Center Meetings Reduced Members’ Practice of Purdah or
Increased Their Participation in Democracy?
Seventy-two percent of the respondents reported that they practice purdah by covering
their head with an achol (end of their sari), while the remainder cover their head with an orna
(scarf).  Thirty-four percent of the respondents reported that they occasionally wear a burqa  (a
black garment that fits a woman from head to toe, with a veil, effectively covering her entire
body) when they leave their bari but only when they are going to visit their daughter-in-law’s
bari or father’s bari.  Of the 66 percent who reported never wearing a burqa, 79 percent did not
wear one because they did not have one.  The remaining respondents reported that they did not
wear the garment because they did not like to wear it.
The 1997-98 union council elections were the first elections in which the national
government encouraged women to run for office on the local union councils.  Ninety-five percent
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of the respondents said they voted in the union council election, reflecting Bangladesh’s national
voting average for women during the same election.25  Of the women, 87 percent reported that
they chose which candidate to vote for without advice from family or friends.  Fifty-nine percent
of the respondents said they did not discuss their views on the candidates with members at the
center meetings.  One of the members explained that the GB employee asked the members to not
talk about the upcoming election at center meetings because such discussions were “too
divisive.”   None of the respondents ran for a union council position.  However, in the district
that was home to Centers A and B, 397 female GB members ran for union council offices.26
Although Rokeya Begum, a very outspoken woman with demonstrated influence in Center A’s
village, was frequently seen campaigning for her favorite candidate, she did not run for a position
on the union council.  When asked why she and the other women did not run for office, Rokeya
Begum explained, “if the men in our village see our courage they may take it away.”  After the
elections many members casually reported that they regretted not running for a position.
Has the Social Capital Formed among Center Members Affected the Daily Lives of Other
Villagers?
Non-GB villagers’ perceptions of change in GB members and their community informed
my inquiry into the broader implications of social capital cultivated at the center.  An influential
male leader in the village remembered that before Center A was established, women in his bari
frequently quarreled.  He explained, “suppose a woman was drying her paddy (unhusked rice) in
the sun but another woman’s chicken started to eat it.  This would start an argument and
sometimes the men would get involved.”  “Now,” he observed, “there are fewer quarrels because
the women know they will have to meet once a week at the center.”  The village leader concluded
that the women would prefer to keep their quarrels to a minimum rather than lose face among the
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group at the center meetings.  Similarly, the village’s NGO health worker reported that she
noticed changes among members during her weekly rounds in the villages’ baris.  “These women
who sit together at the center,” she explained, “did not know each other before membership but
now they do.”  “Suppose a member’s child is out and doing something wrong outside the bari.
Because the women know each other now,” she observed, “they [also] know who this child
belongs to.  I have noticed that now they help the child and the mother by making sure the child
does not do anything wrong.  They help the child to behave.”  The resident family planning
worker also attributed changes in the village to the regular center meetings.  “Every week the
members sit together,” she explained:
You know in my student life I spent time with other students at schoolÖI think it is
something like that.  Now [the GB members] also enjoy sitting together with the other
women and they get pleasure from this. [At the center] they exchange their feelings among
each other.  So their consciousness does not allow them to quarrel with each other any more.
There have been changes.  If the members have any problems now they can settle them in the
meetings.
The relationships formed at Center A, in the opinion of one elderly village man, have
benefited the larger community.  He believed that, since the center was established, adan-prodan
(give and take) had increased among people in the village. Changes a self-sufficient landowner’s
wife noticed in GB members’ social interactions prompted her to include GB members in her
para’s social and economic circles.  In Hosnara Begum’s view, GB members had been “socially
and economically promoted one degree” because of the way they could “talk” to other villagers,
share resources, and take care of themselves.
One Center A member’s husband had also witnessed these changes.  Although Hafez was
initially suspicious of GB’s intentions, he said that he no longer minded that his wife was a
member, in part because he had more friends at the tea-stall. He explained that when he went to
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the tea-stall before his wife’s membership, he recognized most of the other men there but only
spoke with his established circle of friends.  “But now,” he continued, because of our wives’
friendship at the GB center this “has given us something to talk about at the tea-stall so we have
become friends.”
DISCUSSION
Lending Groups
My findings suggest that Center A lending groups were seldom formed from preexisting
direct relationships.  Instead, the lending circles in Center A were primarily formed by one
woman who took the initiative, who may or may not have been the center chief, to make herself
the center’s lending group liaison.  She matched those loan candidates with lending group
vacancies.  In many cases, the women who became members of existing five-member groups did
not know the four other group members.  The women’s economic interest in receiving a loan,
rather than the opportunity to support a group of peers, seemed to mobilize the women to form
Center A’s groups.  Most members agreed that a candidate’s ability to repay her loan was the
primary criteria in selecting a group member.
Individual Identity
The norms of GB membership seem to have facilitated information sharing and trust
among women who, prior to membership, rarely interacted outside their kinship groups.  GB
center norms may have provided many members with the opportunity to build relationships with
other women they did not know.  Meeting norms have also provided the women with an
opportunity to develop their individual identity.  Meeting and joining with friends while walking
across the village to the center meeting, sitting in conversation at the center with a diverse group
of women, handling money for the group, and receiving personal address from a GB employee
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provides each member with a regular opportunity to engage a community as an individual and a
citizen.
The form of address used at GB center meetings provided each woman with regular
personal acknowledgment as a member of the larger community.  Network analyses and survey
questionnaire data suggest that personal address at center meetings enhanced members self
esteem as evidenced in members’ belief they were receiving respect and public recognition.  The
confidence and freedom flowing from the norms of GB membership have emboldened members
to establish personal identities that can succeed into reputations and group membership.
Collective Identity
The network analysis demonstrates that each woman’s network grew with a
corresponding increase in direct relationships.  Center members’ feelings about meeting at the
center building also suggest the women are gradually forming a group identity.  The respondents’
anticipation about weekly meeting at the center demonstrates that members value the weekly
opportunity to convene in a common space where they have made friends.  Their feelings and
network analyses findings point to the importance of regular and frequent meetings.  These
findings suggest GB administrators should not change the weekly meetings to bi-monthly
meetings.
Respondents’ negative feelings about missed meetings focused on the missed opportunity
to interact with other members rather than economic obligation.  The thought that a husband
would prevent a member from continuing her affiliation with the center brought disappointment
to many women’s faces that was then clearly articulated.  They immediately shared their thoughts
about how they would feel if they missed the opportunity to leave their bari and exchange news
with friends at the center.  The members’ feelings were rooted in a desire to interact with friends
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made at the center, rather than fulfill economic obligations of membership.  Most of the women
reported that they had made one to three close GB friends from the center by simply waiting to
repay loans each week.  These feelings of friendship were not defined by economics.  The
friendships were defined by a security that a close friend would come to help another friend or be
a confidante.  The friendships made at the center demonstrate how the simplicity of regular
interaction has transitioned from the initial desire for a loan to a desire for socializing.  The
meetings have brought each member a broader social network she can call on for social support
or simply enjoy as part of her broader social life.
Even when social realities did not predetermine the formation of friendship at Center A,
as Shanti Lota and Bandanna Rani’s story demonstrated, this did not dilute the power of
interaction.  When members told and retold this story they always mentioned that other members
would pressure the women to interact or to at least acknowledge each other.  The social pressure
from Muslim and low-caste Hindu women for a high-caste Hindu woman to interact with a low-
caste Hindu woman was unprecedented.  The women’s interaction at the center especially
encouraged a collective identity because it provided a weekly opportunity for conflict to evolve
into cooperation.  Even if these women never settle their dispute, 38 other women have had the
chance to be part of a dynamic that promoted harmony rather than division.
Social Capital
The components of social capital in healthy communities have been broadly identified by
scholars and practitioners.  But given the chance, how would members of a community define the
components of their own social capital?  In general, Center A members identified their social
capital as the ability to:  interact with women inside and outside the center; rely on new and
stronger networks; move out of their bari to visit other members and travel to “public” spaces in
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the village; exchange scarce resources; and to participate in social obligations.  Bojis’ increased
reliance on marital village networks, and reduced travel to their natal village suggest that they
had become less isolated and more invested in the community.  The members’ social capital has
been powerful because it enabled them to strengthen their place in their family and in village life.
Rokeya, Paru, and Soburon’s stories showed how social capital built at the same building was
used for different needs.  The self-identified components of social capital have expanded each
woman’s life options and introduced new social opportunities for the group.   Interaction at the
center has graduated into new and strengthened networks while mobility has given each woman a
socially sanctioned license to move about the village and, therefore, the opportunity to call on
and continue to build her networks.
Purdah Practice and Democratic Participation
Survey results suggest that Center A and B members had not stopped practicing purdah
after becoming members.  Moreover, Center A members had not employed their networks to run
for office in the latest union council election.  Members had not leveraged the social capital of
center membership to break away from the traditional practice of purdah or break into the
predominantly male union council.  The women continued to honor purdah and remained wary
of flexing any political muscle.  As articulated by Rokeya Begum, such democratic actions would
be misinterpreted by male villagers and would result in a backlash.  Perhaps the GB employee
could have facilitated members’ participation in democracy by nurturing a center environment
where political discussion would have been considered thought-provoking rather than divisive.
Although these results did not show that social capital attained at the center empowered
GB members to enact two particular sweeping changes, they did suggest that the members were
able to honor cultural practices they valued while becoming increasingly aware of their new
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power.  The members demonstrated their ability to balance cultural practices and build awareness
of where their power may lie in the future.  Perhaps most importantly, the members enlisted their
social capital in ways that made sense to their daily lives.
Effects Beyond the Center
Villagers who were not GB members reported collateral community benefits of the GB
members’ regular interaction.  Villagers reported, or at least credited, GB membership with
producing fewer quarrels among members, more child-care, and extended networks for the
village as a whole.  The members’ experiences and new-found relationships brought feelings and
actions of reciprocity to the broader community.  These perceptions suggest that the women from
Center A were gradually strengthening the community’s social fabric.
CONCLUSION
A rural Bangladeshi woman’s identity and relationships are traditionally decided by
patriarchal practices and purdah norms, which contribute to her isolation and therefore limit her
involvement in community life.  NGO involvement can change this dynamic.  My observations at
one GB center have shown how NGO affiliation enables members to attain dignity while
simultaneously altering traditional village practices.  Villagers have done so by taking advantage
of the center space to establish and strengthen social ties that reach beyond their familial
networks.  This process has been nurtured by GB membership norms at the center building.  For
example, when GB workers address rural women by their first names, the women gain
confidence that flows from personal recognition.  This untraditional form of address, in
combination with regular interaction in a common space, enables members to expand their
opinions of themselves from “only” daughters, wives, or mothers to individuals with identities
apart from traditional strictures.  Emboldened with the awareness of identity beyond kinship ties,
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each member began to build a collective identity with an extra-familial group beyond her para.
While participating in the obligatory meetings, members enlisted their networking skills by
building new networks or strengthening existing relationships in a socially sanctioned gathering
place.  Although the social capital cultivated at Center A had not manifested itself into change in
purdah practice or participation in democracy observable from the outside, it had enabled the
women to gradually become invested in community life in ways they were not before GB
membership.  In addition, the relationships established and strengthened at the center have
positively affected villagers who were not GB center members.
Perhaps most important, these findings suggest that the social implications of microcredit
lending can be as powerful as — or even more powerful than —  the economic implications.
Indeed, microcredit alone does not necessarily enable rural women to prosper.  Sustainable
prosperity — both economic and social — seems to be cultivated by regular and frequent
interaction at a sanctioned gathering place.  GB’s approach to loan repayment at the center has
enabled women, as individuals and an integral part of the larger community, to continue to
prosper through trust and community cooperation networks long after the initial acquisition of
financial capital.
Those hoping to build similar programs should look beyond lending group rhetoric and
towards the “center” model.  Rather than focus on an implicit impact gained from small groups,
borrowers should also have ample opportunities to interact with a larger group of individuals
who share their common experiences.  Impoverished rural Bangladeshi women were strategic
planners well versed in household economics and networking, within the confines of kinship
groups and paras, before NGOs arrived on the scene.  GB membership simply gave each woman
an additional opportunity to put her social skills to work among a group of women she would not
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have otherwise interacted with.  This opportunity created a community where 40 women have a
more complex web of exchange and visiting networks simply because they were obliged to meet
weekly and repay loans.  The collective nature of group lending GB style has far reaching
implications on rural women’s ability to build social capital and for villagers outside the GB
organization to benefit.  NGOs can learn from GB’s institutional framework by providing clients
with an opportunity to share experiences and make friendships in a safe environment.  This will
enable borrowers to prosper in ways not possible through access to financial capital alone.
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Table 1.  Group Formation Method
Method Number Percent
Center chief asked them to join 11 28%
Another member (not related) asked them
to join
10 25%
Joined a “broken” group 10 25%
Lobbied center chief and/or another
member for membership
9 22%
Figure 1.  Change in Members’ Knowledge of Other Members’ Names
Before membership:  mean = 11
After membership:  mean = 32
Center A Members:
Change in Knowledge of Names
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Table 2.  Change in Members’ Social Networks
Before Membership After MembershipRelationships Among
Center A Members Number Percent Number Percent
Total possible relationships 1,482 100% 1,482 100%
Direct relationships 531 35.8% 1,367 92.2%
Indirect relationships
(through one other woman)
809 54.6% 77 5.2%
Indirect relationships
(through two other women)
67 4.5% 0 0%
Relationships not formed 75 5.1% 38 2.6%
Figure 2.  Change in Members’ Visits to Their Natal Villages
Natal Village Visits: 
Weekly, Monthly, Every Three Months
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ENDNOTES
                                                          
1 Also as of November 1997, the GB had disbursed a total of US$2.1 billion to 2.2 million loan recipients (Grameen
Dialogue, January 1998).
2 Initially GB loaned to groups of ten or more borrowers.  These groups proved too large to be effective (Islam,
Wahid, and Khan, 1993).
3 A household is defined as those who share a cooking pot.
4 Other microcredit programs have not been as successful.  See Adams and Vogel (1986) and Braverman and Guasch
(1984).
5 A bari (homestead) is a cluster of sleeping houses (approximately 200 sq. ft.) and cooking huts (approximately 20
sq. ft.), inhabited by kinship members, and built around a central courtyard.
6 In general, purdah is practiced by women across rural Bangladesh to uphold Islamic standards of modesty and
morality (Blanchet, 1984).  However, each woman’s definition of and ability to practice purdah varies according to
village, social status, and economic status.  The mobility of boji , throughout the areas investigated for this study, is
especially restricted due to villagers’ belief that new wives do not “belong to” the village.  Gramer meye are
comparatively freer to move throughout the village because they “belong to” the village.
7 A para is a neighborhood.  A number of baris inhabited by families from similar bongsho, castes, or religious
groups may comprise one para.
8 Bongsho is a kinship term that applies to Muslim villagers rather than Hindu villagers.  It “points to the quality of a
patrilineÖas an inheritable and shared attribute [and] it is the most explicit marker of a person’s belonging”
(Kotalova, 1996, p. 113).
9 Proshika is a nation-wide Bangladeshi NGO that focuses on education, microcredit, and consciousness raising for
the poor.
10 For more information on network analysis, see Scott (1991).  I used the STRUCTURE and STRUCTURE
ASSISTANT (Burt, 1989) computer package to compile and analyze network analysis data.
11 At the time of the network analyses, one position in Center A was vacant due to the death of a member.
12 The survey was pretested with six GB members in a village approximately 40 miles north of Dhaka.
13 One woman in Center A did not complete the survey because she was in her natal village recovering from the birth
of her first child.  However, she was later interviewed.
14Each GB “branch” was designed to supervise between 50 and 70 center buildings located within a 2.6 mile radius
of the branch building.  Members receive loans at the branch office and repay the loans at the center buildings.  As of
November 1997 there were 1,100 GB branch offices across rural Bangladesh (Grameen Dialogue, January 1998).
15 When the survey questionnaire was administered to Center B members, the center seemed to be in transition.
Seven women could not be reached for an interview because they had left the village due to loan default.
16 Widows in rural Bangladesh are among the most vulnerable of all the poor.  In the words of one respondent from
Center A, “those who do not have husbands have no limit to their pain.”
17 Repayment and attendance figures were provided by the GB employee in charge of Centers A and B.
18 All personal names used in this paper are pseudonyms.
19 The center chief is an elected position.  All center members vote for one member they believe will be the best
center representative.  At the time of the investigation Rokeya Begum was chief for Center A.
20 A widow continues to be called by her late husband’s last name.  This made it particularly difficult to distinguish
how many widows resided in Center A’s village.
21 In this context the number ten is used colloquially to mean “more than a few.”
22 Kotalova (1996, p.117) explains that “apon” denotes a close family relationship rather than a distant or fictive
family relation.  Amena’s words indicate that her friends from Center A have become as close to her as her relatives.
23 There is a feeling of mutual ownership of the Center A building.  This feeling may be rooted in the fact that when
the center was only two years old, each five-member group pooled their money and collectively purchased their own
bench where they sit every week.
24 None of the women felt they were “breaking” purdah to walk to the center building.
25 Elections in Center B’s district were held two months after the survey was implemented.  Therefore, Center B
members’ voting practices could not be compiled with those of Center A members.
26 My thanks to Mr. Muzammel Huq for retrieving this information for me.  It was later published in  “Results of
Union Parishad Election 1997,” by Grameen Bank’s headquarters in Dhaka.
